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THE EXPANDING COVERAGE OF THE
LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT
Charles Clark*
The history of maritime compensation law has been one of line
drawing and overlaps where state and federal compensation meet.
Initially, the separate systems were treated as mutually exclusive and
their respective jurisdictions were fixed by the perceived limits of
federal constitutional power, congressional policy initiatives, and
judicial interpretations; but more recently, emphasis on certainty and
liberality of remedy has replaced jurisdictional exclusivity as the
talisman.' As the title suggests, the maritime compensation area has
followed other areas of state-federal relations in reflecting an incres-
cent federal power. This expansion has come from litigation pressures
as well as legislative action. The federal system traditionally has
granted higher payments to injured workers. While Congress has
sought to protect those exposed to the hazardous nature of maritime
work, litigators have sought to bring injured workers within the am-
bit of more generous federal protection.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:
"A page of history is worth a volume of logic. "'
Because admiralty and maritime jurisdiction form the anchor that
fixes the reach of federal compensation coverage, we begin with an
historical review of the jurisdictional concept.
The principal basis for federal jurisdiction is, of course, article
III, section 2: "[Tjhe judicial power shall extend . . . to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."3 However, the commerce and
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The author
is indebted to Gerald Lutkus for his assistance in the preparation of this paper.
1. Compare Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924) with Sun Ship,
Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715 (1980). See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY S 6-50 (2d ed. 1975); see also Thompson v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc.,
419 So. 2d 822 (La. 1982) (Louisiana-based worker injured on a fixed platform in navigable
waters of the Outer Continental Shelf held covered by Louisiana Workers' Compensa-
tion Act). This article deals only with the expansion of the federal act. It does not
treat the possibility that exclusivity of federal or state compensation remedies may
still obtain. See Rubin, Sunship Decision Sinks Federal Exclusivity Doctrine in
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Claims, 69 ILL. B.J. 696 (1981).
2. Justice Holmes' famous quote from New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S.
345, 349 (1921) is appropriate here. To appreciate the need for an expansive reading
of the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, one should be cognizant of the historical development of compensation for in-
jured maritime workers.
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2.
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necessary and proper clauses have been suggested as additional
jurisdictional fronts.' Traditionally, the words "admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction" have been interpreted to fix exclusive jurisdiction in the
federal government over areas, persons, and things considered to be
of an admiralty or maritime nature. However, the actual areas, per-
sons, and things covered, as well as the lines marking the boundaries
of coverage have ebbed and flowed with the development of the law.
The Constitution expressly vested control of admiralty and maritime
affairs in the federal government to achieve uniformity of treatment
and thus encourage the then all-important colonial water commerce.'
The Founders sought to create a uniform jurisprudence instead of
permitting state-by-state adjudications to develop haphazard coverage.
The Constitution attempted to accomplish this objective by permit-
ting Congress to create a system of eourts which would exercise
exclusive maritime jurisdiction.'
From the beginning the Supreme Court eschewed the English law7
because England had developed its admiralty jurisprudence in a way
which cabined that country's maritime courts The earliest cases
declared an affinity for the broader maritime views of other nations;
particularly countries on the European continent."
Traditionally, admiralty deals with two types of matters: (1) acts
occurring on navigable waters, and (2) contracts and transactions con-
nected with shipping." For years, location alone fixed jurisdiction over
acts on navigable waters, while the subject matter of contracts and
transactions connected with admiralty determined whether admiralty
jurisdiction was present." Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
4. E. CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 649 (1964).
5. Id. at 646.
6. Congress did this by passing section nine of the Judiciary Act of 1789, in
which district courts were given "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
7. E. CORWIN, supra note 4, at 646.
8. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, at 9-10. The authors stated:
The common law judges ... began issuing writs of prohibition against proceedings
in admiralty except within absurdly narrow limits. In a nutshell, the construction
of the words of the statutes that limited the Admiral's court to things "done
upon the sea" was extremely literal, so that, e.g., contracts having a maritime
subject-matter but made on land (as most were) were held outside the jurisdic-
tion of the Admiralty.
Id.
9. See, e.g., The Octavia, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 20 (1816); The Samuel, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 9 (1816); United States v. The Schooner Betsey, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 442 (1808);
United States v. The Schooner Sally, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 406 (1805); United States v.
La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796); The Seneca, 21 F. Cas. 1081 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1829) (No. 12,670).




Cleveland12 changed this. There the Court held that the crash into
navigable waters of a land-based plane flying between points within
the continental United States would not be covered in admiralty
jurisdiction. 3 Executive Jet laid down the general definition of
maritime-tort jurisdiction-the wrong must bear "a significant rela-
tionship to traditional maritime activity."'" The Court rejected loca-
tion alone as the proper test," basing its reasoning upon a finding
that technology had outstripped the original concept and since
airplanes and other conveyances crossed water in ways entirely
disassociated from normal maritime activity, the single locality require-
ment had become too mechanistic a test."6 Although the Supreme Court
early on articulated a desire to leave the restrictive ambit of English
admiralty law, it initially followed English precedent by restricting
territorial jurisdiction to the high seas and to only that portion of
the rivers which was affected by the ebb and flow of the tide. 7 The
Court then moved admiralty jurisdiction inland to a point 95 miles
above New Orleans. 8 Finally, in The Propeller Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh," the Court extended admiralty jurisdiction to all navigable
waters of the United States."' This expansion has been retained to
the present.
Accommodations between state and federal courts "wrought to
correspond to the realities of power and interest and national policy"
have resulted in a not-always consistent jurisprudence." However,
Supreme Court holdings have reflected a willingness to allow state
law to function in all areas except those where it might disrupt a
12. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
13. Id. at 272. The flight was to be from Cleveland, Ohio to White Plains, New
York, with an intermediate stop in Portland, Maine. Cf. Ward v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation, 684 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549
(U.S. Jan. 25, 1983) (No. 82-566).
14. 409 U.S. at 268.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 268-71.
17. The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
18. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847). In Waring, the Supreme Court
sustained admiralty jurisdiction over a Mississippi River collision. The location was
infra corpus comitatus, that is, within the body of a country. Id. at 462.
19. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). The case involved the Lake Ontario collision of
the schooner Cuba and the Propeller Genesee Chief. Id. at 450.
20. The Court noted in The Propeller Genesee Chief-
Now there is certainly nothing in the ebb and flow of the tide that makes the
waters peculiarly suitable for admiralty jurisdiction, nor anything in the absence
of a tide that renders it unfit. If it is a public navigable water, on which com-
merce is carried on between different States or nations, the reason for the jurisdic-
tion is precisely the same.
Id. at 454.
21. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 375 (1959).
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uniform application of federal maritime law." For example, for many
years, federal courts borrowed state wrongful death remedies for use
in state territorial waters to provide a parallel remedy to that created
offshore by the Death on the High Seas Act.23
THE BEGINNINGS OF MARITIME COMPENSATION
The first judicially significant line between state and federal com-
pensation remedies was drawn by Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen."
The division, known as the Jensen line, was drawn at the edge of
the navigable waters of the United States. Jensen held that a New
York compensation statute was unconstitutional in its application to
maritime workers. The Court found that the state had legislated in
a way that would destroy the uniformity of federal maritime and
admiralty jurisdiction. 5 To the water's edge states could go, but no
farther. The navigable water was the federal realm, within which the
nation's admiralty jurisdiction held exclusive sway. When Congress,
in 1917, enacted a statute giving maritime suitors a right to use state
compensation statutes," Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart7 held it to
be an unconstitutional delegation of power to the states. In 1922, Con-
gress sought to moderate its 1917 enactment by providing that those
in maritime pursuits, other than masters and crews of vessels, could
resort to state compensation laws.28 Again, the Court struck down
the act, in Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co. 9 In the course of that
decision, the Court suggested that a federal compensation remedy
should be legislated. ° Congress followed the suggestion in 1927, pass-
ing the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA), which created a federal compensation remedy for
nonseamen who could not "validly" be covered by state compensation
laws. " While that act created a precise and discernible line dividing
22. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
23. See, e.g., The M/V Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
24. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
25. Id. at 216.
26. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395.
27. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
28. Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 395.
29. 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
30. Id. at 227-28.
31. Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (codified at 33 U.S.C. S 901-950).
33 U.S.C. S 903(a) provides:
(a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability
or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury
occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoin-
ing pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoin-
ing area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or




the state and federal remedies, it also appeared to create a severe
and rigid limitation. In an effort to ease this rigidity, the Supreme
Court interpreted the statute to permit state compensation coverage
in areas defined vaguely as "maritime and local."" This effort to
delineate a boundary between state and federal jurisdiction turned
out to be more confusing than helpful. The Court then introduced the
"twilight zone" in Davis v. Department of Labor.3 This case changed
compensation concepts from a bright line separation to overlapping
coverages which permitted state compensation for the survivor of a
bridge worker drowned in navigable waters. The next major decision
was Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.34 It interpreted the coverage
phrase in the federal act ("if recovery . . . may not validly be pro-
vided by State law") to merely fill in coverage where state acts were
forbidden to go. Calbeck authorized payment of LHWCA compensa-
tion to two harbor workers injured after the vessels they had been
welding on ashore were moved into navigable waters. LHWCA com-
pensation was allowed despite the fact that state compensation
remedies also were available. The Court thus sought to eliminate the
guesswork as to which act applied and the consequent possible loss
of all coverage by maritime workers in this area." But, in a later
return to rigidity, the Court, in Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson,"
construed the federal statute to deny coverage to those longshoremen
whose work took them shoreside of the Jensen line during the course
of the loading and unloading process. In 1980, Sun Ship, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania" summarized the situation as follows:
Before 1972, then, marine-related injuries fell within one of three
jurisdictional spheres as they moved landward. At the furthest
extreme, Jensen commanded that nonlocal maritime injuries fall
under the LHWCA. "Maritime but local" injuries "upon the
(1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person engaged by
the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net; or
(2) An officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof or of
any State or foreign government, or of any political subdivision thereof.
32. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); Western Fuel Co.
v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
33. 317 U.S. 249 (1942). The Court noted that there is "clearly a twilight zone
in which the employees must have their rights determined case by case." Id. at 256.
34. 370 U.S. 114 (1972).
35. Id. at 135-36.
36. 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
37. The Court stated that while Congress had the power to extend the coverage
of the LHWCA to coincide with the limits of admiralty jurisdiction, "the plain fact
is that it chose instead the line in Jensen separating water from land at the edge
of the pier. The invitation to move that line landward must be addressed to Congress,
not to this Court." Id. at 224. Congress acted upon this suggestion in 1972 and amend-
ed the LHWCA to extend coverage to some shoreside injuries.
38. 447 U.S. 715 (1980).
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navigable waters of the United States," 33 U.S.C. § 903(a), could
be compensated under the LHWCA or under state law. And in-
juries suffered beyond navigable waters-albeit within the range
of federal admiralty jurisdiction -were remediable only under state
law. 9
Nacirema's check on judicial expansion led to congressional action.
THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
In 1972, Congress amended the 1927 Act 0 to extend federal com-
pensation coverage to all persons, except the master and crew of any
vessel,41 who were "engaged in maritime employment" and were on
navigable waters.42 An additional purpose of the amendments was to
extend shoreside coverage under the federal scheme to maritime
employees.43 The precise language of the statute is as follows:
Sec. 902(3). The term "employee" means any person engaged in
maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other per-
39. Id. at 719.
40. 33 U.S.C. § 901-950 (1976), as amended by Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251. For discus-
sions of the 1972 amendments, see Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act-After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 1 (1974); Robert-
son, Jurisdiction, Shipowner Negligence and Stevedore Immunities Under the 1972 Amend-
ments to the Longshoremen's Act, 28 MERCER L. REV. 515 (1977); Robertson, Negligence
Actions by Longshoremen Against Shipowners Under the 1972 Amendments to the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 7 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 447 (1976);
Comment, Shoreside Coverage under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 135 (1976); Comment, The Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Coverage After the 1972 Amendments, 55 TEX.
L. REV. 99 (1976); Comment, Broadened Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 LA. L. REV.
683 (1973).
41. H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4698, 4708. The House Report also noted:
The Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not engaged in loading,
unloading, repairing, or building a vessel because they are injured in an area
adjoining navigable waters used for such activity. Thus, employees whose respon-
sibility is only to pick up stored cargo for further trans-shipment would not be
covered, nor would purely clerical employees whose jobs do not require them
to participate in the loading or unloading of cargo.
H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4708. The legislative history of the amendments will not be extensively
examined in this article because of the thoroughness with which it is covered in several
Fifth Circuit opinions. See, e.g., Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d 1034,
1034-43 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1983) (No. 82-605).
42. H.R. REP. No. 1441, supra note 41, at 10, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4708.
43. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4707-08.
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son engaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker in-
cluding a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such
term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel,
or any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair
any small vessel under eighteen tons net."
Sec. 902(4). The term "employer" means an employer any of whose
employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in
part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including
any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine
railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer
in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel). 
5
Sec. 903(a). Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in
respect of disability or death of an employee but only if disability
or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable
waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf,
dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoin-
ing area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading,
repairing, or building a vessel).46
The language of the amendments and their legislative history reveal
that the amendments' principal design was to increase benefits 7 and
broaden compensation coverage for federal maritime employees.41
However, there was a legislative trade-off. While workers received
more expansive rights, employers gained the elimination of the
Sieracki-Ryan liability that courts had placed upon stevedoring com-
panies and vessels." The compromise eliminated covered workers' use
of the unseaworthiness remedy against vessels, thus also cancelling
warranty of workmanlike performance claims brought by vessels
against stevedores 0 The amendments expressly left intact, however,
a worker's tort remedy for a vessel's own negligence, as distinguished
from a claim based on the negligence of a stevedore or a fellow
longshoreman.51
44. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)
45. 33 U.S.C. S 902(4).
46. 33 U.S.C. S 903(a).
47. H.R. REP. No. 1441, supra note 41, at 1-3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4699-70.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 4-8, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4701-05. See Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85 (1946). Gilmore and Black adopt the view that this purpose was primary.
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, at 411.
50. H.R. REP. No. 1441, supra note 41, at 4-8, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.




The "Situs" and "Status" Requirements
Determining whether a worker is covered under the LHWCA is
a matter of knowing where the line falls, and to know where that
line is drawn, all one needs to know is "situs" and "status."52 This
is, as they say, easier said than done. Briefs piled higher than the
waves on a stormy sea have attempted to define these terms. Ten
years have passed since these terms proclaimed the boundary markers,
and despite some clarification, precisely where situs and status draw
the line is still awaiting final location."3 A recent Supreme Court deci-
sion, though, goes a long way toward clarifying the situation.
Situs means that the accident must occur "upon the navigable
waters of the United States" or any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock,
terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel.'
52. P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 78 (1979); Northeast Marine Terminal
Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264-65 (1977).
53. The courts of the Fifth Circuit litigate most of the nation's maritime compen-
sation cases. The largest number of maritime appeals occur in the Fifth Circuit. The
most recent statistics available show that of the 295 marine injury cases pending in
the circuit courts of appeals, 211 of the cases are in the Fifth Circuit. ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE, UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR A-12 (1981). The Sec-
ond Circuit had the second highest total with 22 pending cases. Id. The United States
District Courts in the Fifth Circuit also had the highest number of pending marine
personal injury cases of any of the circuits. Of the 5,074 cases docketed nationwide
as of June 30, 1981, 2,996 cases were in district courts in the Fifth Circuit. Id. at
A-19. It is therefore nationally significant from the standpoint of quantity, if not quality,
that this circuit liberally construes the LHWCA's situs and status requirements in
response to the amendments' remedial nature. This liberal construction is articulated
in the following recent decisions on the amendments: Ward v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation, 684 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549
(U.S. Jan. 25, 1983) (No. 82-566); Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d 1034
(5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'g 664 F.2d 463 (1981), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S.
Jan. 25, 1983) (No. 82-605); Miller v. Central Dispatch, Inc., 673 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1982);
Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1981); Gilliam v. Wiley N. Jackson Co.,
659 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1983) (No.
81-1039); Hullinghorst Indus. v. Carroll, 650 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982); Alford v. American Bridge Div., 642 F.2d 807 (5th Cir.), on reh'g,
655 F.2d 86 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 927 (1982); Mississippi Coast Marine Co. v.
Bosarge, 637 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1981); Howard v. Rebel Well Serv., 632 F.2d 1348 (5th
Cir. 1980); Boudloche v. Howard Trucking Co., 632 F.2d 1346, cert. denied, 452 U.S.
915 (1981); Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 903 (1981); Trotti & Thompson v. Crawford, 631 F.2d 1214 (5th
Cir. 1980); Odom Constr. Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 622 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981); Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co. v. Kininess,
554 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977); Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp.
v. Morgan, 551 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976).
54. 33 U.S.C. 5 902(4).
[Vol. 43
MARITIME PERSONAL INJURY
The conjunctive status requirement mandates that a covered worker
be a person engaged in whole or in part in maritime employment,
including any longshoreman or harbor worker. "Harbor worker" in-
cludes ship repairmen, shipbuilders and shipbreakers, but not masters
or members of a crew of any vessel or a person engaged by a master
or crew to unload a small vessel.5 Both'House and Senate Reports
accompanying the legislation emphasized that the definitions given
in the amendments were intended to be precise.' They even express-
ly negated coverage for those who only picked up stored cargo for
transshipment.5 7
The Situs Requirement
The situs requirement is the easier of the two to grasp. It comes
from the section 902(4) definition of an employer as a person whose
employees are engaged in whole or in part in maritime employment
upon the navigable waters of the United States.58 Navigable waters
are defined to include areas which commonly abut the waterfront or
any "other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading,
unloading, repairing, or building a vessel."59 The purpose of this
change, Congress noted, was to extend coverage landward to
longshoremen and other shoreside, yet, maritime workers. ° From both
statutory language and legislative history, it is obvious that this situs
requirement expanded the geographic area in which the LHWCA could
be applied.
The decisions of this circuit have implemented the spirit of Con-
gress in attempting to expand coverage to those injured workers Con-
gress intended be covered 5 by the Act. The intent was to create
uniform coverage 2 and shoreside protection for maritime workers. 3
55. 33 U.S.C. S 902(3).
56. The Committee stressed its intent by specifying which employees would not
be covered. H.R. REP. No. 1441, supra'note 41, at 11, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4708.
57. Id. See note 41 supra.
58. 33 U.S.C. S 902(4). See Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S.
249, 279 (1977).
59. 33 U.S.C. S 902(4). The same language is repeated in S 903(a), which states
that compensation will be paid if death or disability results from an injury which occurs
upon navigable waters.
60. H.R. REP. No. 1441, supra note 41, at 10-11, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4708.
61. See, e.g., Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980)
(en banc), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
62. "Congress intended to apply a simple, uniform standard of coverage." P.C.
Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 83 (1979).
63. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 263 (1977).
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Therefore, as the Fifth Circuit stated in Jacksonville Shipyards v.
Perdue,' a narrow, technical construction of the LHWCA tradition-
ally has been disfavored. 5 Jacksonville Shipyards held that the amend-
ments are to be liberally construed in favor of injured employees
because of the Act's remedial nature."6 In the en banc decision in Tex-
ports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester,67 the Fifth Circuit gave the phrase
"adjoining area customarily used" an expansive definition.68 It said
in Texports:
Although "adjoin" can be defined as "contiguous to" or "to border
upon," it is also defined as "to be close to" or "to be near." "Ad-
joining" can mean "neighboring." To instill in the term its broader
meanings is in keeping with the spirit of the congressional pur-
poses. So long as the site is close to or in the vicinity of navigable
waters, or in a neighboring area, an employee's injury can come
within the LHWCA. 9
For the Fifth Circuit to restrict the territorial area of coverage to
lands abutting the water's edge would be to retreat to the harshness
of the Jensen line. Narrow coverage would recreate the congressionally
condemned situation in which maritime workers frequently walked
in and out of coverage as they performed their work."0
The facts of Texports" are helpful in showing how the decision
has affected coverage under the Act. Winchester was a "gear man"
for Texports Stevedore Co. The company had, within the vicinity of
the Houston Shipping Canal docks, three "gear rooms" for the storage
and maintenance of longshoremen's gear. However, because warehouse
space was not available around the docks, the third gear room was
five blocks from the gate of the nearest dock. Winchester reported
there every day for his assignment. Although he sometimes worked
dockside or aboard ships, he was working at the gear room on the
day he was injured. A strict interpretation of the language of the
Act would have made Winchester's compensation depend on the
availability of rental space in the area contiguous to the docks. His
employer's inability or refusal to rent a facility directly touching the
docks, the Fifth Circuit decided, should not necessarily be dispositive
of Winchester's right to be compensated for his injury.
64. 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), afJ'd sub nor. P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S.
69 (1979).
65. Jacksonville Shipyards v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 540 n.20 (5th Cir. 1976).
66. Id. at 540 n.21 (citing Voreis v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953)).
67. 632 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
68. 632 F.2d at 512.
69. Id. at 514.
70. Id. See also P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 83 n.18 (1979); G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, supra note 1, at 424.
71. The facts of Texports are reported at 632 F.2d at 506-07.
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The decision warned that the site of the injury must have a tight
geographic nexus with the waterfront."2 The dissenters' exaggerated
suggestion that the decision could be extended to the stevedore's
downtown Houston offices was bluntly rejected.73
Labels are not dispositive in determining situs.7" For example, in
Alford v. American Bridge Division,75 the Fifth Circuit found an 86-acre
former shipyard along the Sabine River in Orange, Texas to be a
maritime situs.6 The workers were injured there while constructing
ship modules which were to be assembled elsewhere into a complete
vessel. The court found that the work at this Sabine River plant was
part of modern-day shipbuilding.7 In former times, ships were con-
structed from stem to stern in one shipyard. Today, specialized
manufacturers, spread across the country, frequently manufacture dif-
ferent sections of the craft for final assembly in some distant location."8
If a ship was completely constructed alongside a pier in a shipyard,
all of the pier-side workers engaged in such construction clearly would
be covered by the Act. Simply because the manufacture of certain
parts is now geographically diverse, the coverage afforded those same
dispersed maritime workers should not be diluted.
The importance of the situs roquirement is two-fold. First, it is
a less harsh equivalent of the Jensen line. There must be some limita-
tion on how far inland coverage can extend under an act which is
maritime in nature. The situs/nexus requirement supplies that
limitation." Second, the situs requirement notifies an employer of the
area in which a worker may be covered. As the Fifth Circuit noted
in Odom Construction Co. v. United States Department of Labor, "the
phrase 'customarily used by an employer...' was inserted to ensure
that an employer could be liable only when it had real or construc-
tive notice that an area was used for maritime purposes and was
therefore likely to be a covered situs."'81 Analysis of the situs require-
72. Id. at 514. The court noted that "the outer limits of the maritime area will
not be extended to extremes." Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 513.
75. 642 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 927 (1982).
76. Id. at 809-10. The Benefits Review Board (BRB) had denied compensation for
three workers in the case-Alford, Buller, and Cantu. The Fifth Circuit panel reversed
the BRB's findings as to Alford and Buller, but it affirmed the denial of benefits to
Cantu. On rehearing, the panel decided that Cantu also was a covered employee and
reversed the BRB holding. Alford v. American Bridge Div., 655 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1981).
77. 642 F.2d at 815.
78. Id.
79. Texports, 632 F.2d at 518.
80. Odom Constr. Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 622 F.2d 110, 114 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981).
81. 622 F.2d 110, 114 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981).
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ment makes it clear that the Fifth Circuit continues to liberally con-
strue the Act in a manner consistent with its remedial nature.82 Labels
are not critical to the analysis; nexus is. If a close link can be established
between the site of the injury and the waterfront, it is inconsequential
that there are non-maritime buildings between the two locations" or
that the site is removed from the water's edge.
The Status Requirement
The Fifth Circuit, as most others, has had difficulty defining and
delineating the status element in the LHWCA test,84 as is evidenced
by the volume of "judicial ink"85 which has been spilled over it. On
its face, the requirement that a worker be in maritime employment
does not appear to involve a difficult inquiry. Application to real cases
is the rub. The courts of the Fifth Circuit have had to determine
whether the following persons were working in maritime employment:
(1) an airplane pilot who flew above the Mississippi Sound spotting
fish for fishing boats;" (2) a maritime service agency truck driver who
was exposed to noxious fumes aboard a ship while delivering a de-
tained seaman to a ship's captain;87 (3) a man injured while erecting
a scaffold beneath a pier extending over the Mississippi River;88 (4)
a carpenter Who repaired 30-foot pleasure boats in his employer's
waterfront boatyard;88 (5) a wireline operator working on a drilling
barge located in Louisiana territorial waters;0 (6) a land-based con-
struction worker injured while involved in a two-day project moving
four large concrete blocks from beneath the water near a river bank."
In all of these instances, the Fifth Circuit found the workers to
82. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 268; Ward v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation,
684 F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1983)
(No. 82-566); Gilliam v. Wiley N. Jackson Co., 659 F.2d 54, 58 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1983) (No. 81-1039).
83. Texports, 632 F.2d at 513.
84. Professor Robertson contends that the meaning of "maritime employment"-
the status requirement of LHWCA-is "ambiguous." Robertson, Injuries to Marine
Petroleum Workers: A Plea for Radical Simplification, 55 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1977). He
suggests that the "lack of clarity on the meaning of the status limit is the primary
difficulty in defining 'coverage of the Act." Id. at 980 n.56.
85. Alford, 642 F.2d at 811.
86. Ward v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 684 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1983) (No. 82-566).
87. Miller v. Central Dispatch, Inc., 673 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1982).
88. Hullinghorst Indus. v. Carroll, 650 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982).
89. Mississippi Coast Marine v. Bosarge, 637 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1981).
90. Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1981).
91. Odom Constr. Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 622 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981).
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be involved in maritime employment. The reasoning involved is critical.
It can best be extracted from three recent Fifth Circuit decisions:
Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc.,92 Ward v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation,93 and Hullinghorst Industries v. Carroll.94
The cases suggest that a distinction must be made between land-
based workers performing maritime tasks and maritime workers in-
jured while upon navigable waters. Let us look first at the Fifth Cir-
cuit's approach to workers who ordinarily work upon navigable waters,
exemplified in Boudreaux and Ward. Boudreaux held that maritime
employment status included workers in the offshore oil industry. This
was based on a reading of the 1972 amendments to cover all persons
in maritime employment, not merely longshoremen and the types of
harbor workers expressly mentioned in the Act. 5 The Fifth Circuit
more broadly interpreted the term "maritime," which had initially been
used to connote shipping or navigation, to mean located on or near
the sea. 6 Maritime employment no longer was limited to employment
involving the movement of goods by traditional ships or the naviga-
tion of those ships on the high seas. Boudreaux's holding departed
from some predictions. Robertson, in his thorough 1977 analysis of
the rights of offshore oil industry workers, had agreed with Gilmore
and Black that the meaning of "maritime employment" was ambiguous
and might not cover such workers. 7 The holding led the Boudreaux
dissenters to say that the Fifth Circuit's definition of "maritime
employment" was so broad that status was eliminated as a coverage
requirement distinct from situs s They took the position that the ma-
jority had erroneously proclaimed that any person injured on the sea
was covered.9
Less than a month and a half after the Fifth Circuit en banc opin-
ion in Boudreaux, a three-judge panel, in Ward v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation,"' said that Boudreaux held that "an employee
92. 680 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'g 664 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1983) (No. 82-605).
93. 684 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1983)
(No. 82-566).
94. 650 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
95. 680 F.2d at 1054.
96. Id. at 1048.
97. Robertson, supra note 84, at 980.
98. 680 F.2d at 1054 (Gee, J., dissenting).
99. Id. The extended coverage does not confer a benefit without burden. By bring-
ing offshore oil workers into the compensation act fold, the Act granted them access
to a speedy, certain compensation remedy for minor injuries. At the same time, though,
it deprived them of the more remunerative remedy for unseaworthiness and, through
indemnity, of recovery for stevedore negligence.




injured in the regular course of his employment on the navigable
waters of the United States automatically meets both the status and
situs tests.'.. Ward's key restriction, however, is that the employee
must be -on those navigable waters within the normal course of his
employment."2 The panel expressly reserved the question of whether
coverage extended to a person whose employment brought him "tran-
siently or fortuitously" onto the waters.' 3 This interpretation affirms
that the status requirement has not been abandoned by this circuit
in every instance in which a worker is injured while on navigable
waters. His presence there must be regular as well as in the course
of his employment and logically must be of a maritime nature. "Status"
is liberally interpreted, as it should be under the Act, but it is not
abandoned.
While Boudreaux and Ward solve the puzzle for injured workers
who regularly perform maritime tasks on the navigable waters, Hull-
inghorst points to the Fifth Circuit's position on land-based workers
injured while working within the expanded maritime situs. In
Boudreaux, this court favorably cited Hullinghorst for its summariza-
tion of some of the "jurisprudential criteria" used in determining
whether or not shoreside workers come under the Act."' In Hull-
inghorst, Carroll was injured while erecting a scaffold beneath a pier
extending over the Mississippi River. The court found that he was
covered under the Act.0 5 His work was "an integral part of an in-
disputable maritime pier repair project, an essential and indispensable
step in the repairs to be effected."'0 8 The Fifth Circuit noted that the
work was "not incidental," nor was it the type of job "peripherally
related to maritime matters that Congress said was not to be covered
by the LHWCA." °7 The court found that the project directly furthered
the goals of the loading facility involved and it clearly bore a
"realistically significant relationship to 'traditional maritime activity
involving navigation and commerce on navigable waters'.""1 8 It was
immaterial that the skills being used by Carroll were not solely
101. 684 F.2d at 1116. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Calbeck,
which held that prior to 1972, any worker who in the course of his duty was obliged
to go on navigable waters, however briefly or sporadically, and who suffered an in-
jury while in that historically maritime locality was covered by the pre-1972 LHWCA.
Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
102. 684 F.2d at 1116.
103. Id. at 1116 n.3.
104. 680 F.2d at 1049 n.30.
105. 650 F.2d at 752-53.





maritime in nature. "It is the purpose of the work that is the key,"
the panel declared.0 9
The "realistically significant relationship" test is now used in deter-
mining whether shoreside workers are within the protective cover
of the compensation act. But the analysis does not stop there. To deter-
mine that the employment is maritime, the court must find that the
worker was regularly engaged in maritime work at the time of the
injury"' or that at least "some portion" of the employee's overall work
assignment involved maritime employment."' Earlier in 1982, in Miller
v. Central Dispatch,"' this court extended coverage to a truck driver
who was transporting a foreign seaman detained by American im-
migration officials. The driver transported the seaman to a vessel
docked nearby."' While aboard that ship, the driver was exposed to
noxious fumes which later resulted in an illness. The court found that
Miller was engaged in maritime employment since more than just
"some portion" of her work was devoted to traditionally maritime
work."' The guarding and transportation of detainees was found to
be essential to maritime commerce." 5
The test is "some portion" and not a "substantial portion." The
Benefits Review Board attempted in 1980 to make the standard
stricter by using the "substantial portion" test, but the Fifth Circuit
disallowed this interpretation in Howard v. Rebel Well Services"' and
Boudloche v. Howard Trucking Co."' Relying upon language from the
Pfeiffer decision, the Fifth Circuit said that only "some portion" of
the employee's work need be maritime in nature. The amount of time
that a worker must spend in maritime employment has been liberally
interpreted by the Fifth Circuit. In Boudloche, the claimant did
longshoring-type work as little as 10 percent of his time."8 In Odom,
109. Id.
110. Ward, 684 F.2d at 1117 (citing Thibodaux v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 580 F.2d
841, 844 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979) ("an employee could satisfy
the status test in two ways: he might, at the time of injury, be engaged in an activity
properly classified as maritime employment, or he might be engaged in an occupation
considered maritime employment") (emphasis in original). See also Gilliam v. Wiley N.
Jackson Co., 659 F.2d 54, 57 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan.
25, 1983) (No. 81-1039); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d at 539-40.
111. Howard v. Rebel Well Serv., 632 F.2d 1348, 1350 (5th Cir. 1980); Boudloche
v. Howard Trucking Co., 632 F.2d 1346, 1348 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
915 (1981).
112. 673 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1982).
113. The facts of the case are reported at 673 F.2d at 774-75.
114. Id. at 781.
115. Id.
116. 632 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1980).
117. 632 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1981).
118. 632 F.2d at 1347.
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no employee worked in the maritime area for more than 10 percent
of his work hours.' In each instance, there was enough maritime
employment to meet the "some portion" requirement.
THE VIEW FROM OTHER CIRCUITS
The status and situs requirements have been briefed and argued
in all of the maritime circuits in this country. The Second Circuit,
which also has a heavy volume of LHWCA cases, was recently faced
with an interesting case.20 A self-styled "historical ironworker and
shiprigger.""' was injured while working on a ship moored at the South
Street Seaport Museum in New York City. The ship had been towed
to the museum. Prior to the towing, it was rendered unseaworthy
when its rudder was fastened in one position. The worker was in-
jured while working in a bosun's chair suspended from the riggings.
Although the situs requirement was met, the Second Circuit rejected
the claimant's bid for compensation under the LHWCA, questioning
whether work on an unseaworthy museum piece was truly maritime
employment."'
The critical LHWCA issue now, however, is whether or not those
workers engaged in employment upon navigable waters who were
covered under the Act prior to the 1972 amendments are still
necessarily covered today."' The issue has arisen regularly."' The
affirmative position is frequently argued and always supported by the
Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation. 21 Unfortunately, the
119. 622 F.2d at 114.
120. McCarthy v. The Bark Peking, 676 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated, 51 U.S.L.W.
3552 (U.S. Jan. 25 1983) (No. 82-53). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the
Second Circuit for reconsideration in light of Director, Office of Workers' Compensa-
tion Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 51 U.S.L.W. 4074 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No.
81-897). See note 134, infra.
121. 676 F.2d at 45 n.5.
122. Id. at 45-46.
123. Boudreaux, 680 F.2d at 1037.
124. Ward 684 F.2d at 1116; Boudreaux, 680 F.2d at 1038-39; Browning v. B.F. Dia-
mond Constr. Co., 676 F.2d 547, 549 n.2 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549
(U.S. Jan. 25, 1983) (No. 82-4); Churchill v. Perini N. River Assocs., 652 F.2d 255, 258
(2d Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v.
Perini N. River Assocs., 51 U.S.L.W. 4074 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 81-897); Trotti &
Thompson v. Crawford, 631 F.2d 1214, 1222 (5th Cir. 1980); Fusco v. Perini N. River
Assocs., 622 F.2d 1111, 1113 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981); Brown
& Root, Inc. v. Joyner, 607 F.2d 1087, 1090 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 961
(1980); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 539 n.12 (5th Cir. 1976);
Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, 539 F.2d 264 (lst Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 908 (1977); Weyerhauser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
125. The Court noted in Boudreaux that the Director supports the view that the
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circuits have come down on both sides of the issue."' The Fifth Cir-
cuit has taken the lead in supporting continued coverage of those
covered prior to 1972. In Boudreaux, this circuit addressed the issue
directly and decided in favor of expansive coverage.
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, decided in Weyerhauser Co.
v. Gilmore" that Congress did not necessarily intend to continue to
cover those who were protected under the pre-1972 wording of the
Act.!28 The Ninth Circuit chose to apply the "realistically significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity" test to all injured
workers, on either side of the beach."',
The Second Circuit adopted the same view in Churchill v. Perini
North River Associates"' when the court affirmed an administrative
law judge's denial of benefits for a dock building foreman. Churchill
was injured on a crane barge on navigable waters while supervising
the unloading of caissons at a pollution control project construction
site.13 The Second Circuit rejected his argument that both Davis and
Calbeck rendered it unnecessary to apply the status and situs test
amendments do not change the coverage afforded under Calbeck. "The Director has
filed amicus briefs to this effect in a number of cases, including this one, and he once
proposed published guidelines that would accord with this conclusion." 680 F.2d at
1046 n.22.
126. Compare Boudreaux, 680 F.2d at 1029; Brown & Root, Inc. v. Joyner, 607 F.2d
1087, 1090 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 961 (1980) ("for we are confident that em-
ployment held to be traditionally 'maritime under the former Act has not been stripped
of its maritime character by the 1972 Amendments."); and Stockman v. John T. Clark &
Son of Boston, 539 F.2d 264,274 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977), with Churchill
v. Perini N. River Assocs., 652 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 51 U.S.L.W. 4074 (US.
Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 81-897) (rejected the position that Calbeck makes it unnecessary to apply
the situs and status test when the injury occurs on navigable waters); Fusco v. Perini N.
River Assocs., 622 F.2d 1111, 1113 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981); and
Weyerhauser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868
(1976) ("Congress clearly did not intend to broaden the class of covered employees to in-
clude anyone injured in an adjoining area."). The Eleventh Circuit was confronted with
the issue and opted not to decide it in Browning v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co.; 676 F.2d 547,
549 n.2 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1983) (No. 82-4).
127. 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1975).
128. Id. ,at 960.
129. Id. at 961.
130. 652 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Director, Office of Workers' Com-
pensation Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 51 U.S.L.W. 4074 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983)
(No. 81-897).
131. Churchill was working on a dock over navigable waters at the time of his
injury. A caisson, a hollow circular tube used for construction in water, was being
unloaded when a line snapped. The line hit Churchill's legs and threw him into the
air. He suffered injuries to his head, leg, and thumb.
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whenever an injury occurred upon navigable waters.132 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the case.33 Its recent reversal of the Se-
cond Circuit's decision confirms that the Fifth Circuit's course is a
proper one.'34
The Court held that when a worker is injured on "actual navigable
waters'35 in the course of his employment on those waters, he satisfied
the status requirement in § 2(3), and is covered under the LHWCA,
providing, of course, that he is an employee of a statutory 'employer,'
and is not excluded by any other provisions of the Act."'36 In so
holding, the Court rejected the approach taken by the Second and
Ninth Circuits and implicitly upheld the Fifth Circuit's position in
Boudreaux. 17 Justice O'Connor reviewed the Supreme Court's inter-
pretations of the 1927 Act and then examined the legislative history
of the 1972 amendments to the Act. She wrote that the Court was
"unable to find any congressional intent to withdraw coverage of the
LHWCA from those workers injured on navigable waters in the course
of their employment, and who would have been covered by the Act
before 1972."'13' The legislative history was found to exhibit a congres-
132. 652 F.2d at 258.
133. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs.,
50 U.S.L.W. 3668 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982) (No. 81-897).
134. When the Supreme Court decided Perini, it also cleared the decks of all pend-
ing LHWCA cases. It vacated and remanded McCarthy v. The Bark Peking, 676 F.2d
42 (2d Cir. 1982), for reconsideration in light of Perini. 51 U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. Jan.
25, 1982) (No. 82-53). See text accompanying notes 120-122 supra for facts of the case.
The Court denied certiorari, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1983), on six LHWCA
cases after the Perini decision was published: Ward v. Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs, 684 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1982) (No. 82-566) (LHWCA benefits
awarded to dependents of pilot killed when plan crashed while he was "spotting fish"
in Gulf Coast waters); Schwabenland v. Sanger Boats, 683 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1982)
(No. 82-523) (LHWCA covers sales manager for manufacturer and seller of recreational
and racing boats who was injured while testing boat); Boudreaux v. American Workover,
Inc., 680 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (No. 82-605) (worker required to go upon
navigable waters in course of duties is per se engaged in maritime employment and
thus covered by the LHWCA); Browning v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 676 F.2d 547
(11th Cir. 1982) (No. 82-4) (rig foreman injured while supervising unloading of barge
moored in navigable waters covered by LHWCA); LeMelle v. B.F. Diamond Constr.
Co., 674 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1982) (No. 81-2362) (construction worker injured while building
drawbridge over navigable waters is engaged in maritime employment for LHWCA
purposes); Gilliam v. Wiley N. Jackson Co., 659 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1981) (No. 81-1039)
(bridge construction site foreman injured while unloading pilings from barge is covered
by LHWCA); Holcomb v. Robert W. Kirk & Assocs., 655 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1981) (No.
81-1109) (LHWCA covers night watchman injured aboard ship in port for repairs).
135. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, used the phrase "actual navigable
waters" to describe the covered situs as it existed in the 1927 LHWCA, 44 Stat. 1424.
51 U.S.L.W. at 4074 n.2.
136. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4081.
137. Id. at 4075 n.8.
138. Id. at 4079.
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sional intent to move federal compensation coverage landward of the
Jensen line, but showed no corresponding intent to withdraw coverage
from those employees traditionally covered by the Act. 139 Likewise,
there was no indication in the legislative history that in moving com-
pensation coverage landward, Congress added the status requirement
to mandate that an employee injured upon navigable waters must show
that his employment possessed a direct (or substantial) relation to
maritime commerce or navigation."'
The Court's opinion makes it clear that the status test is not
erased for workers injured upon navigable waters in the course of
their employment."' It does require a court to view injuries on land
and upon navigable waters in two separate analytic modes. The land-
based worker injured in an area adjoining the waterfront must meet
both the status and situs tests. The worker who is injured while upon
"actual navigable waters," to meet the status test, must show that
he was injured in the course of his employment, that he is an employee
of a statutory employer, and that he is an employee "traditionally
covered" by the pre-1972 LHWCA. 42 That done, the worker is found
to meet the maritime employment requirement of the status test. He
must then fulfill the situs requirement, which given his presence upon
actual navigable waters, should prove to be an automatic determina-
tion. The Fifth Circuit's view of the 1972 amendments as shown in
Boudreaux agrees with Perini. Such an interpretation of the Act is
consonant with the intent of Congress to expand the number of
workers covered, favor injured workers, apply uniform coverage, and
prevent a worker from walking in and out of coverage during his work-
ing day.'
CONCLUSION
Where does this reading of the situs and status requirements cause
the line to be drawn? Fortunately for me, my office requires that I
take the judicious approach and say that its precise location depends
139. Id. at 4079 n.27.
140. Id. at 4079. Justice O'Connor noted that Congress is presumed to "know the
law." Id. at 4080 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979)).
Therefore in passing the amendments in 1972, Congress is presumed to know the ex-
tent of LHWCA coverage as interpreted by Calbeck. Congress failed to specifically
overturn Calbeck, though it did, in the legislative history, show its clear intent to over-
rule two other cases, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), and Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). 51 U.S.L.W. at 4080.
141. Id. at 4081.
142. Id. at 4081 & n.34. The Court, as did the Fifth Circuit in Boudreaux, specifically
reserved judgment as to the federal compensation coverage afforded a worker injured
while transiently or fortuitously upon actual navigable waters. Id. at 4081 n.34.
143. See Pfeiffer, 444 U.S. at 83 n.18.
1983]
868 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
upon the outcome of future cases. For now, I can only assure readers
that it takes in those workers who spend some portion of their
worktime in maritime employment when they are injured within the
situs area, the outer limit of which is clearly inland from the water's
edge, but still this side of downtown Houston.
